

This Notice Expires 1 February 1982

MANAGEMENT

HN 7-44
25 June 1981

LESSONS OF WILSON-TERPIL

1. I have reviewed the events underlying the major two-part article appearing in The New York Times magazine concerning the criminal activities of Messrs. Wilson and Terpil, two former Agency employees. The FBI was first informed of these matters by the CIA immediately after another former employee reported them to this Agency. This same former employee, pursuant to advice given to him by the Office of Security at the time, also reported these matters directly to the FBI. This renewed publicity about the Wilson-Terpil case unfortunately once again will focus attention on the actions of former employees and their apparent ability to trade on their contacts with former colleagues still in CIA employ. This is especially so in view of implied allegations in these recent articles that such activities may still be taking place. Certainly, at a time when we are getting off the defensive so that we can concentrate on improving our support of the national interest, criticism of this kind based on events of long ago can only divert us from our essential job. I am resolved, and I seek your individual commitment, to assure that these kinds of activities, reflected by the Wilson-Terpil case, do not recur. I am satisfied that the Agency acted properly and forcibly when it learned of the Wilson-Terpil activities. We will address any allegation of continued or additional misconduct in the same way. Now, we must see that all of us do everything we can to see that activities of this kind do not recur.

2. We must not permit the actions of a few to undermine the efforts and reputation of the many. It is incumbent upon us, therefore, to be alert to avoid actions, while we are employed at the Agency, in our dealings with former colleagues and in our post-Agency employment, which may reflect adversely on the Agency. In this regard, it is useful to recall the comments and cautions of my predecessor contained in the June 1977 notice set forth below:

"1. Recently, two employees were asked to leave the Agency as a result of developments growing out of their unofficial relationships with former employees. This should serve as a reminder of the very real problems that can occasionally arise in dealings with former employees. The Agency has been characterized by strong bonds between its employees, and these bonds often transcend the significant changes in status that are brought about by retirement or resignation. It is essential that current Agency employees realize that resignees and retirees do indeed acquire a new status which precludes the access and privileges associated with active service in the Agency. The vast majority of former employees are well aware of their new status and scrupulously avoid any situations which might cause

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

25 June 1981

problems for their former colleagues. Unfortunately, a few former employees are apparently willing, perhaps without realizing the potential consequences, to exploit current employees in order to obtain unjustified personal or professional advantages for themselves.

"2. Employees should be guided by the basic fact that a former employee with no active official connection with the Agency is not authorized continuing access to classified information as a result of his former association. Moreover, former employees are entitled to no more assistance or service from the Agency than are any other citizens of our country. For example, should a former employee embark upon a second career which places him in a position of being a potential vendor of goods or services to the Agency, he must be treated the same as and must compete with any other vendor offering comparable goods or services. Given the vast number and types of situations that can arise in dealings with former employees, it is not possible to cite all the examples here. Agency employees must exercise careful judgment at all times to ensure that all unofficial relationships with former employees are proper and above reproach. . . . There are a few basic questions which employees should ask of themselves when evaluating their unofficial relationships with former employees. For example:

"a. Am I being asked to provide Agency information or other assistance for nonofficial purposes?

"b. Am I being asked to participate in some non-Agency activity to convey the impression that the Agency is officially involved?

"c. Would I conduct this relationship in the same manner if the other party had not been previously associated with the Agency?

"d. Am I becoming involved in an activity which may involve or create the appearance of a conflict of interest with my official Agency responsibilities?

"3. Employees preparing for a second career which will draw upon skills and contacts developed while with the Agency must ask themselves the same kinds of questions. Upon retirement, they must be fully reconciled to the fact that their former Agency status must not be traded upon for preferential treatment in dealings with CIA.

"4. Employees who become involved in relationships with former employees about which they have questions should seek guidance promptly from their supervisors. If a supervisor cannot answer the question with confidence, the employee should be referred to the more specialized offices. The

MANAGEMENT

25 June 1981

Operations and Management Law Division* of the Office of General Counsel, the Employee Activity Branch of the Office of Security, or the Office of the Inspector General should be consulted for assistance in this regard.

"5. All of us value continuing relationships with our former colleagues, and it is not the intent of this notice to discourage such associations. Rather, this notice is intended to point out that such associations must be conducted in a manner which avoids actual or apparent improprieties -- improprieties which can cause serious harm both to the individuals involved and to the Agency. I urge your personal and thoughtful attention to this matter."

3. Although the activities now being reported in the press occurred several years ago, I urge you to continue to be sensitive to these cautions and request that you immediately bring to the attention of the Inspector General any information which would indicate that inappropriate actions are being carried out by any Agency employee or that any former employee may be abusing his or her previous relationship with the Agency. With your help, I am confident that we can put this matter behind us, prevent activities of this kind from recurring, and continue to demonstrate the professionalism, skill, and dedication which are the hallmarks of Agency service.

William J. Casey
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

DISTRIBUTION: ALL EMPLOYEES (1-6)

* Current Title - Administrative Law Division